While the intuition underlying a zero knowledge proof system [GMR85] is that no "knowldge" is leaked by the prover to the verifier, rebnarchers are just heginning to analyze such proof sys-~.crnu in herrm of formal notions of knowledge. III this paper, we show how interactive proof systems motivate a new notion of praciical knowledge, and we capture the definition of an interactive proof system in terms of practical knowledge. Using this notion of knowledge, we formally capture and prove the intuition that the prover does not leak any knowledge of any fact (other than the fact being proven.) during a zero knowledge proof. We extend this result to show that the prover does not leak any knowledge of how to compute any information (such as the factorization of a number) during a zero knowledge proof. Finally, we define the notion of a weak interactive proof in which the prover is limited to probabilistic, polynomial-time computations, and we prove analogous security results for such proof systems. We show that, in a precise sense, any nontrivial weak interactive proof must be a proof about the prover's knowledge, and show that, under natural conditions, the notions of interactive proofs of knowledge defined in [TW87] and [FFS87] are instances of weak interactive proofs.
Introduction
The notions of interactive proof and :evo knozrl1-edge, introduced by Goldwasser, Micah, and Rackoff in [GMR85] , have been the subject, of ext,ensivc research (see, for example, [BC86, FFS87, F&37, GHY85, GM W86, GS87, Ore87, TW87] ). Informally, an interactive proof is a two-party conversation in which an infinitely powerful "prover" tries to convince a polynomial-time "verifier" of the truth of some fact cp (typically of the form 3: E L) through a sequence of interactions.
Roughly speaking, such an interactive proof is said to be zero knowledge if, whenever cp holds, the verifier is able to generate on its own the conversations it could have had with the prover during an interactive proof of cp. Intuitively, the verifier does not learn anything from such conversations with the prover (other than the fact 'p) that it could not have learned on its own by generating these conversations itself. Consequently, the only knowledge gained by the verifier during an interactive proof is that which the prover initially set out to prove.
This informal discussion makes it quite clear that our intuition concerning interactive proofs and zero knowledge is intimately related to a notion of knowledge. While this intuition is quite compelling, it is based on an operational notion of being able to generate whose formal relationship to knowledge is not immediately obvious. It is this relationship that is the focus of our paper.
The formal notions of knowledge needed to capture our understanding of interactive proofs and zero knowledge are far more subtle than the standard information-theoretic notion of knowledge that has been used successfully in the analysis of distributed systems (see, for example, [CM86, DM86, FI86, Had87, HM84, HZ87, LR86, MT88, NT87, PR85] ; see [Hal871 for an overview). Since both probability and the computational power of the prover and verifier play crucial roles in the definition of zero knowledge, the notions of knowledge used to reason about zero knowledge must take these issues into account. It is relatively straightforward to extend the standard nol.ion of knowledge to include probability.
Our definit ion of probabilist.ic knowledge is b,ased OIL definitions given by Fa.gin a.nd Halpern in [F1188] . Dealing with colnpI(~sity, however, is more difficult. 'I'hc approach wc uw is based on the notion of rc,so~ircc:-I)o~~ntlf:d knowlctlge introduced by Moses in [Mos88] . While a number of extensions of resource-bounded knowledge ;tre possible, we believe ours are well-suihed to the context of cryptographic protocols, as well as other contexts.
An issue related to the notion of knowing a fact is that of knowing how to perform various operations. For example, there is a difference between knowing the fact that a certain number is a product of two primes and knowing how io generate the two prime factors. Zero knowledge proofs are not intended to leak any knowledge of this kind as well as any knowledge of facts. While t,his notion of "knowing how" has also been of great interest in Philosophy and AI (SW [Moo%]), .t. d, 1 s m <lr( not#ions of knowlctlgc do not rnpt.ure this aspect. of knowlcdgc. '1'0 do so, we define i1 not ion of linowiilg how to gcn~~t-al.~ a. ?/ satisfying a relation n(.r, !I), wit.hin given rcsourcc I~o~it~tls.
The main cant ributioils of this pap~\r are: l 1\:e capture t.he dcfinit.ion of an int,cractive proof using knowledge and probability.
We then show how interactive proofs motivate the definition of practical knowledge, and capture the definition of an interactive proof in terms of practical knowledge.
l Using practical knowledge, we prove that with high probability the verifier in a zero knowledge proof of x E L knows a fact cp at the end of the proof iff it knows 2: E L > cp at the beginning of the proof. Intuitively, this captures the idea that zero knowledge proofs do not "leak" knowledge of facts other than those t.hat follow from 2 E L. l We define a notion of krlowillg 11ow to generate au satisfying a relation R(z, y), and prove that with high probability if the verifier in a zero knowledge proof of CC E L knows how to generate a y satisfying R(x, y) at the end of the proof, then it knows how to do so at the beginning as well. This captures our intuition that at the end of a zero knowledge proof the verifier can not do anything that it could not do at the beginning. l We consider weak inleraclive proofs, in which the prover is restricted to probabilistic, polynomialtime computations (and hence is no longer infinitely powerful). This is the most relevant context in practice. While interesting interactive proofs for membership in a language do exist (see [GMR85, GMW86] ), we prove that any language L having a weak interactive proof is COIItained in UPP, and hence the verifier can determine whcthcr 2: E L 011 its own without consulting the prover.
C0IlsftC~llfYltly, we iwe Ictl to consider weak interactive proofs about the prover's initial state (that is, the prover's knowledge) rather than weak interactive proofs of language membership.
We then proceed to show that, under natural conditions, the notions of interactive proofs of knowledge defined in [FFS87] and [TW87] are instances of weak interactive proofs. Finally, we show that zero knowledge weak interactive proofs guarantee the same type of security with respect to the facts they prove as zero knowledge interactive proofs guarantee with respect to language membership.
We believe that this analysis provides a great deal of insight into (and support for) the definitions in [GM11851 and their extensions to the case of proocs about knowledge in [FFS87, TW87] . None of the technical results is very deep; the difficulty was in Corning up with the right notions. We hclicvc that our vicwpoint provides a good framework in which to think about these definitions and their appropriateness.
Fischer and Zuck [FZ87] also consider notions of knowledge appropriate for cryptographic protocols. They give definitions that are related to the ones given here (we discuss the relationship in the full paper) and use their definitions to analyze an interactive proof of quadratic residuousity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review how to ascribe knowledge to processors in a distributed system, how to extend the standard definition of knowledge to include probability, and how to account for bounds on the processors' computational resources. In Section 3 we review the definition of an interactive proof, and capture this definition in terms of probabilistic knowledge. In Section 4 we show how interactive proofs motivate the definition of practical knowledge, and capture the dcfinition of an interactive proof system in terms of prsctical knowledge. In Section 5 we define zero knowfedge. This definition of zero knowledge is a weaker definition than that given in [GMR85] , and hence our results will hold for [GMR85] as well. In Section 5.1 we make precise (using knowledge) the intuition that in a zero knowledge proof the verifier does not know any more at the end than it did at the beginning. In Section 5.2 we define the notion of "knowing how," and show that, in a precise sense, the verifier cannot do any more at the end cd a zero knowledge proof than it could at the beginning. Finally, Section 6 introduces weak interactive proofs, relates them to the proofs of knowledge of [Fl?S87, TW87] , and proves that zero knowledge weak interactive prool's are secure in the senses defined above.
Knowledge
Our analysis of interactive and zero knowledge proof systems depends heavily OII the definitions of knowledge, probabilistic knowledge, and resource-bounded knowledge. We now briefl:y revie,w these definitions. Since we will be considering only probabilistic protocols running in synchronous systems, we will restrict the generality of these definitions to this context.
We begin with a sketch of our formal model of computation (cf. [DM86, MT88] ).
The distributed systems we consider consist of a finite collection of processors, each pair of which is connected by a. twc+way communication link. Processors share a global clock that starts at time 0 and ,proceeds in discrete increments of one. Computation in the system proceeds in rounds, round m lasting from time m -1 to time m. During a round, every processor first performs some (possibly probabilistic) local computation, then sends messages to other processors, ant1 then rcccivcs all messages sent to it during the round. Each processor begins with some initial local state at time 0. At any given time, a processor's local state consists of the current time on the global clock, its initial :state, the history of messages it has received from other processors, and the history of coin flips it has used. A global state is a tuple of local states, one for each processor. We think of each processor as following a protocol which specifies in any given state what messages each processor is required to send as well as what actions it is required to perform as a (possibly probabilistic) function of the processor's local state. An infinite execution of such a protocol (a.n infinite sequence of global states) is called a mn. We define a system to be a set of such runs, often the set of all possible runs of a particular protocol. Given a run r and a time m, we refer to (r,m) as a point, and we say that (r,m) is a point of the system R if r E R. We denote the global stat'e at the point (T*,TI~) (that is, the global state at time rn in r) by r(m), and we denote the local state of pr,ocessor q in r(m) by rq(m).
We now turn to the standard definition of knowledge in distributed systems (cf. [CM86, FI86, HF85, IIM84, PR85] ). Th e intuition behind this definition is that a processor can be said to I;now that a fact 'p is true if, based on its information about the current state of affairs, 'p must be true. Roughly speaking, therefore, the processor q is said to know (o at a point (r,m) if 'p is true of all points q considers possible at (r,m). Since a processor's knowledge depends on the set from which the points it considers possible may be chosen, a pr Jcessor's knowledge is always defined with respect to a system a. We assume that we have a collection of primitive facts about, the system, fact,s such as "the value of the variable :c is a prime nurnbe? that do not involve the proc.essors' ktlowlcdgc. Each fact cp is identified with a set I of poillt,s interpretcd <as the set of points at which 9 holds. \\'c sn\ that a point (r, m) in a system '72 snfisfies ,o, which we denote by ('R,r,m) I= cp, if (r,m) E T(P). L!'e often write (r, m) k cp rat.her than (72, r,m) k y when the system 72 is clear from context.
We say that a fact cp is valid in Ihe syslem 72, which we denote by R b 'p, if ( r, m) + 'p for all points (r,m) of R. We extend this collection of primitive facts to a logical language by closing under the usual boolean connectives and several modal operators. Two modal operators included are the linear t,emporal logic operators 0 and 0: the formula •~ holds at a point (r,m) iff the formula 'p holds at all points (r, m') with m' 2 m; and 0~ holds at (r,m) iff the formula cp holds at some point (r, tn') wit,11 171' 2 1~. Most interesting, however, are the modal operators Ii,, one for every proc'ssor ,I, where tli<x forlllula I\',p is read "17 klloWY cp." As previously illdic*i~tcd, IY,(c is tlefirlcd as follows: (I*, 771) b fi& iff (r', m) k p for all p0iiit.s (r',m) of R such that r,(m) = r;(m).
A processor thercforc knows precisely t,hose fac(,s that. follow fro111 the information contained in it.s local state.
We are often interested in facts that, although they do not hold in all the states that a processor considers possible, do hold at a certain fraction of those points. When reasoning about probabilistic systems, it is important to be able to make statements such as "according to q, the fact p holds with probability cr." Intuitively, such a statement might mean that (Y is the conditional probability of cp, given q's local state. Fagin and Halpern formalize and generalize this intuition in [FH88] as follows. Given a system R, they associate with every processor q and every point c = (r, 111) a probability space T(g, c) '= (Sy,e, Xq,(, /lu,e), where S,,, is a. set of points, S,,, is it set 0F mrasurahlc subsets of ,'&, and P~,~ is a probability measllre. Intuitively, the set S,,, is a subset of t.11~ points q thinks possible at c, and pq,c determines the prohabi1it.y with which q considers a particular point in S,,, t,o be the actual point c. The set S,,,(cp) is then defined to consist of those points in S,,, at which cp holds. In order to reason about probability, we allow formulas of (#he form Pv~(Jo) 2 Q, with semantics defined by c k Prqp 1 cy iff ~~,,(S,,,(cp)) 2 a.l We define I<fp to be an abbreviation for K, (Pr,(cp) 2 a), which intuitively says that processor q knows that cp must hold with probability at least (Y. Finally, we define Eap to IX au abbreviation for A~Z<~~, where the conjunction is t,aken over all the processors in the system. Int.uit.ivc:ly, E"cp 111caus that c~ery processor knows tl~at. 'p n~nst hold with probability LY.
This definition of probabilistic knowledge lcaves open a gtcat deal of flexibilit,y iu the choice of probabilit,y spaces P(q, c). While it may seem at first that the correct choice for S,,, is the set of all points q is unable to distinguish from c, the analysis in this paper has shown that, due to the subtle interaction between the nondeterministic and probabilistic choices made by processors, there are good reasons to choose S,,, to be a subset of these points. Consider, for example, the system determined by two processors q and q' running the following one-round protocol: processor q' starts with a one-bit. initial state, flips a fair coin, and performs a particular action a iff the outco~nr of the coin toss is equal to t.he bit, in it,s init#inl state. Clearly, this system consist,s of four runs of t.bc forui Tb,f, where 6 is the value of t.lte bit. in (I"S initial st,ate and f is the outcome of t,he coin flip. Now lc% us consider the probability wit.11 which q knows at time 0 that q' will perform 0. Suppose t.hat. wit.11 cvcry tiillcx 0 point we associat,e l,hc probabilit,y space coiisistiug of all time 0 point*s (not#ice that q considers all such points to be possible at time 0). Since the only probability distribubion we have is on the coin flipped by q', the only nontrivial event.s to which we can assign a probability are ((rO,h, 0), (rl,hr 0)) ("the coin lands heads") and {(~o,*J%(n,t,O)} ("th e coin lands tails"); we cannot assign a probability to the event "q' performs a"! Suppose, on the other hand, that with every time 0 point we associate the probability space of time 0 points having the same initial global state; that is, we can associate with a point of the form (~b,,, 0) the probability space {(n,h, O), ( rb,l, 0)). In this probability space, we assign each of ((rb,h, 0)) and {(fb,l, 0)) probability l/2. Conscquent,ly, at every poiut q considers possible at time 0, the probability according to q that q' performs a is l/2, and it follows t1la.t q knows with probnbi1il.y l/2 that q' performs a, as we would expect,. (This esamplc is discussed in great*er detail in [FII88] .)
This observation leads us to choose the probability space associated with the processor q and point 'Fagin and Halpern actually write m,(v) 2 a instead of Prp((p) > a, and in fact define a much richer language than we do here. They also show how to deal with the possibility ofnonmeasurable sets. As our sets Sp,J'p) will always be measurable, we omit these detaiIs here. c = (r,m) as follows.
We take SQlt to be the set of points (r',m) such that r'(m) = r(m) (that is, the set of points (r',m) having the same global state as (~,m) ).
Notice that in our model, given a global state at time m, each run having that global state at time m is determined by the sequence of coins flipped after time m in the run. Consequently, t:ach set S,,,(cp) can be identified with a set of coil) flips, which in this paper will always be measurable. The probability measure pq,e therefore assigns to the event S,,,(p) the probability of the set of coin fiips identified with S,,,(v). Notice that having made this choice of probability spaces, the operators Prq are identical for all q, and hence we will omit subscripts in the remainder of this works2
Returning to the standard definition of knowledge, notice that a processor is said to know all facts that follow from its local state, regardless of the computational complexity of determining that these facts hold. When analyzing cryptographic protocols, where the computational intractability of a problem is used to keep secret certain pieces information, such a notion of knowledge is clearly inappropriate.
In [Mos88], Moses introduces a notion of resource-bounded knowledge that takes into account bounds on a processor's computational resources. The intuition behind this notion is t,hat the only way a resource-bounded processor can know a fact is if it can compute that it knows this fact. In this work we are concerned with the facts a processor can compute using a probabilistic test running in time polynomial in some parameter depending on its current state (usually that parameter will be 121, where t is the common input). Thus, we consider only BPP knowledge, which seems most appropriate in the context of interactive proofs. Given a system R, a probabilistic algorithm M is said to be a BPP iest for K,cp in R if, for all points (P, m) of R, M's computation starting from r,(m) runs in time polynomial in 1x1, accepts with probability at least 2/3 if (r,m) b K,cp, and rejects with probability at least 2/3 if (r, m) k K,cp. We say that q BPP-knows 'p at a point (r,m) of R, denoted by (r,m) ,I= II',Bpp(p, iff 2We note that there are at least two notions of proba bilistic knowledge that seem relevant in the context of cryptographic protocols, the one given here and another outlined in [FZSS] (the spirit of which can be captured in the framework of [FMSB] ). Each has its own philosophical advantages, and we refer the reader to (FH88, FZ88] for extended discussions. However, since the definitions of interactive proofs and zero knowledge state conditions on the objective probability of events at time 0, we will be concerned only with a processor's probabilistic knowledge at time 0, and at time 0 the two definitions of probabilistic knowledge coincide. We have chosen the definition outlined here since the fact that the probabib ity spaces are independent of the agent simplifies our analysis slightly.
(r,m) k K,cp and there is a BPP test for fC,cp in 'R. Thus, a processor BPP-knows cp if it knows cp and there is a BPP algorithm w&h which it can compute that it knows cp. (Of course, there is nothing special about the values 2/3 used in the definition of BPP tesl;s. We could have used any value bounded away from and above l/2.) Similar notions of knowledge can be defined with respect to other complexity classes. We refer the reader to [Mos88] for a detailed discussion of a number of interesting properties of these notions of knowledge.
Interactive Proof Systems
In this section, we first review the notion of an interactive proof system (our definitions arc essentially those of [GMR85] ), and then show that the definition of an interactive proof system can be captured in terms of probabilistic knowledge. An interactive protocol is an ordered pair (P, V) of probabilistic Turing machines. P and I/ share a read-only input tape; each has a private one-way, read-only random tape; each has a private work tape; and P and V share a pair oi one-way communication tapes, one from P to V being write-only for P and read-only for V, and the other from V to .P being write-only for V and read-only for P. A run of the protocol (P, V) is defined as follows. To begin with, the input tape is initializedl with some common input, say x; each random tape is initialized with an infinite sequence of random bits; each work tape may or may not be initialized wi.th an initial striug;3 and the communication tapes ar'e initially blank. The run then proceeds in a sequence of rounds. During any given round, V first performs some internal computa tion making use of its work tape and other .readable tapes, and then sends a message to P by writing on its write-only communication tape; P then performs a similar computation.
Eitlher P or V may halt the interaction at any time by entering a halt state. V accepts or rejects the interaction by entering an accepting or rejecting halt state, respectively, :in which case we refer to the resulting run as either an accepting or rejecting run. The running time of P and V during a run of (P, V) is the number of ste,ps taken by P and V, respectively, during the run. We assume that V is a probabilistic
Turing machine running in time polynomial in 1x1, and hence that it can 3The motivation for allowing initial values on the verifier's and prover's work tapes can be found in [Ore87, TW87] . Allowing initial information on the prover's worktapc is particularly important in the case of resource-bounded provers considered in Section 6. perform only probabilist,ic, I.'olynoIlrinl-t.ime computations during each round. For now we make no assumptions about the running t,ime 01' P, although in Section 6 we shall restrict attention to probabilistic, polynomial-time provers. The system corresponding to runs of the interactive protocol (P, V) cdn be described in terms of the computational model defined in Section 2 as follows. The system consists of two processors, p and 21, running the protocols P and V, respectively. A run is an infinite sequence of global states, where each global state consists of a local state for each of p and V. Processor p's local state is a tuple consisting of a description of the Turing machine P, the current round number, the contents of the input tape, the finite prefix of its random tape read up to this point, the contents of its work tape, the contents of t4he t,wo communicat.ion tapes, and the position of the t#ape heads on each of these tapes; processor V'S local st,n.t.c is definc~l in R similar fashion. We denote by P x t' t,he syst.em consisting of all possible runs of (P, \I), by P x W' t,he system consisting of the union of the systems P X V* for all probabilistic, polynomial-time V" , by T x V t,he system consisting of the union of t.he systems P' x I: for all Turing machines P', and by 'Pf'P x V the system consisting of the union of the systems P' x V for all probabilistic, polynomial-time P'. Note that we distinguish p and v, the "prover" iand the "verifier" respectively, from the protocols that they are running. In the system P x V, the verifier is always running the same protocol (namely V) in all runs. In the system P x VP, the verifier may be running different protocols in different runs.
Let us denote by (P(,>,V(t))(x) the random variabie assuming aa values the runs of (P, V) (according to the probability distribution generated by the protocol (P, V)) in which the prover's work tape is initialized with s, the verifier's work tape is initialized with t, and the input tape is initialized with c. An interactive protocol (P, V) is said to be an inlernctizre proof system for a language L if the following conditions are satisfied:
For every k and suficiently large 2, and for every s and t, if x E L then
accepts] 2 1 -Izlmk .
l Soundness: For every Ic and sufficiently large z:, for every P' , and for every s and t, if CC g! L then
Pr [(P*(s), V(t))(e) accepts] 5 IxlBk.
We refer to p as the "good prover" when it is running P, and to v ;1s the "good verifier" when it is running V. The completeness condition is a guarantee to both the good prover and the good verifier that if 2 E L, then with overwhelming probability the good prover will be able to convince the good verifier that c E L. The soundness condition is a guarantee to t.he good verifier that if c $ L, then the probability that an arbitrary (possibly malicious) prover is able to convince the good verifier that x E L is very low. Notice that in our soundness condition, the "sufficient.ly large 5" depends only on the value of L, and not on t.he choice of P'. In the original definition of interactive proof given in [GMR85] , it is not clear whether the dependence is on k only or on both C and I". As Shafi Goldwasser pointed out to us, in the case of iIt6 nit,cly powerful provers, it doesn't nuatter what clloicc we niakc. (More foruudly, an int8cractivc proof syst.cnr (I', V) is sound with respect to one choice ilf it is sonnd with respect to t.he ot.ltcr; we prove this in the futl paper.) However, the cltoicc does make a difference in the case of resource-boundrd provers, as we shall see in Section 6.
We can translate these completeness and soundness conditions immediately into statements about probability in our language as follows. Let init be the fact holding only at points at the beginning of a run, and let. accept be the fact holding only at points at which the verifier has accepted. Propositiorr 1: An interactive protocol (P, V) is an interactive proof system for a language L iIf the following conditions are satisfied: 0 Co7~tplcfc7tcss: For every $ t.hert exists c such tt1a1.
l Soundr~ss: For every k there exists c such that
The constant c above is necessary due to the fact that the probabilistic guarantees made by the definition of an interactive proof system hold only for "sufficiently large 2 ." Notice that if 1 -c Iz\-~ is negative, then Pi 2 1 -c 1~1~~ is equivalent to Pi 2 0, which is valid for every fact cp. Consequently, by choosing c so that 1 -c IzI-~ < 0 for insuffic.iently large c we obtain a formula holding for all 2, and hence valid at all points of the system. While this constant, c does not appear in the formal definition of nn interactive proof system, an equivalent definition 137 of interactive proof systems can be formulated making use of such constants just as we do in Proposition 1.
Notice that, according to Proposition 1, a formula such as Pr(x E L 3 Oaccep2) 1 1 -c Ixlmk holds at time 0 but not necessarily at later points. After the verifier has rejected, for example, it is clearly not the case that with high probability the verifier will eventually accept. In general, even before the verifier has actually decided to accept or reject, a particularly bad sequence of coin flips can significantly lower the verifier's chances of eventually accepting. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the verifier's probability space is changing with every step. (ln our case, the probability space we associate with a point is the set4 of points having the same global state, a set that dcf-rf:asf:s iu six with every step.) Consequently, tile antecedent ini is crucial in the formulas above.
Since the facts appearing in l'roposit.ion 1 are valid, all processors know these facts at all points. Furthermore, all processors know the fact init whenever it holds. Since from Kq ini and K,(inil > $) we can deduce K,$, we can deduce the following corollary to Proposition 1.
Corollary 2: An interactive protocol (P, V) is an interactive proof system for a language L iff the following conditions are satisfied: l Completeness: For every k there exists c such that
Sowndne.ss: For every k there exists c such that 'P x v l= ittit 3 fij-"~~~-*(Oaccept 3 x E L).
In ot,ln!r wortls, (f, V) is compl~:i.c! if both the good prover and the good verifier know with high probability that if 2: E L, then the good prover will convince the good verifier to accept; and (P, V) is sound if the good verifier knows with high probability that, no matter what protocol the prover is running, if the verifier accepts x then 2 E L. It is actually the case that if (P, V) is sound then every prover also knows with high probability that if the verifier accepts z then x E L (that is, we could have replaced K~-c'Z'-k by E1-'121-' in the case of soundness above); we have chosen this formulation since it is the good verifier's knowledge that is essential in the context of soundness.
Practical Knowledge
As we have just seen, the definition of an interactive proof system can be characterized in terms of probabilistic knowledge. This characterization, h.owever, is a slight reformulation of the original definition in terms of very similar concepts. It does not capture, for example, the intuition that at the end of a.n interact#ive proof of z E L with tlhe good prover, the good verifier knows that z E L despite its limited compulational power. In this section we show how the definition of an interactive proof system motivates a new notion of pruc2ical knowledge which will enable us to formalize this intuition.
In later sections, practical knowledge will play a crucial role in capturing the security provided by zero knowledge proof systems.
We have already argued that the notion of rsesourcebounded knowledge introdu.ced in [Mos88] seems to be a natural way of capturing the knowledge of a resource-bounded processor, with RPP knowbedge being most relevant to the cryptographic setting. Unfortunately, there is a notion of "learning" of great importance to cryptographic protocols (and, in particular, to interactive proof systems) that can not be captured directly in terms of BPP knowledge. Consider, for example, a fact cp such as "the input x has a factor smaller than @.
At. a point in which the processor has the factorization of z available to it, say the factorization happc:ns to be written 011 its work tape, and x has a small factor, we might like to say that the processor knows 'p despite iits limited resources. Recall that a processor BPP-knows p iff it knows cp and it has a BPP test for p. Assuming that there is no BPP test for 'p, our processor will never BPP-know 'p. This is true even when it has the fa.ctorization written on its work tape. Thus, a naive use of the notion of BPP knowledge does not seem to allow us to capture the idea of learning. Notice, however, that when a processor Ends the factorization of t on its work tape and hence is able to determine that 'p holds, the processor learns a great deal more than just the fact (o. It actually learns a fact $ that implies cp, where $ is the fact "the factorization of x is on the work tape, and it con ta.ins a factor smaller than p.
Since this fact 1,6 is clearly BPP testable, the processor actually BPP-knows $J. In other words, the processor learns cp as a result of coming to BPP-know a stronger fact II, that implies cp. In this sense, the notion of learning 'p can bc captured in terms of BPP knowledge.
At this point, one might be tempted to define a notion of learning in whiclh a processor lea,rns cp at a point if at this point it BPP-knows a fact $ that implies 'p. Unfortunately, this notion of learning is not very useful to a resource-bounded processor. It could be, for example, tha.t at every point the processor BPP-knows a different fact II, implying 'p (and hence has "learned" cp everywhere) and yet is unable to determine at a particular point which fact 1c, it should test for in order to determine that, it knows cp. Alternatively, one might be temptctl t,o define a notion of knowing cp with respect to a particular test A{ where, informally, a processor knows cp wit#h respect, to Al if with t,lie test. I%T the processor can dt'ft>rtninc tha.t it. knows cp. Wc consider such notions t.o Ire uusatisfactory, however, since if knowledge is t,o be used for protocol specification it must ba possible to abstract the particular tests being used. We not,e t,hat the definition of resource-bounded knowledge already existentially quantifies over such tests (so these tests do not appear in the notation used), and we do not want to reintroduce them here.
We take an alternative (and more direct) approach to capturing Iearning. The idea is to define a notion of BPP knowledge of 'p relative to a set A of points. We can think of the points of A as the points at which a processor learns cp. Roughly speaking, this means that we have a BPP test for li',cp that, correctly determines whether Q knows v at all points of rl, hut may only satisfy weaker requirements off ~1 [in particular, t,hc t,est. may not be required t,o accept, with high probability at. poiut,s off .4 a.t. which li,p holds)."
More formally. we proceed ns follows. We say that. a test A4 is SOUIIA for cp a. where 'in A' is the fact holding at precisely those points in A.
The first condition is a technical one, which ensures that knowledge with respect to A can hold only at points of A. We restrict attention to points in A since these are the only points of interest (and the only ones where our test is guaranteed to be correct). The second condition requires that cp actually be known, as is required by BPP knowledge. The third condition requires the existence of a test for (p that is sound on 7Z a.nd complete on A.
It is clear that a processor BPP-knows 'p iff it BPPknows \p with respect to the set of all points in R, and hence that, the definition of UPP knowledge with respect t.o a set. of points is a direct gcncrnlizat.ion of 111'1' knowlctlg~. In fact,, it is c;lsy to see thal if tlrc fad 'in A' is testable in BPP, thrn I<~"t',A~ is equivalent to KaPP('in A' A cp). Furthernrorc, notice t.hnt , r we are now able t#o ca.pt,ure the notion of a processor learning a fact cp (as the result of its nncxpected acquisition of information.
Returning to our example, let A be the set of points where q has the factorization of z on its work tape. Let M be the test that rejects if the factorization of x is not on the work tape or if the factorization is on the worktape and there are no small factors. This test M for 'p is clearly sound everywhere and complete on A. Thus, when Q learns from the factorization of t on its work tape that cp must. be t,rue, q knows cp with respect to the set A.
The reader may wonder at the asymmetry of our definition.
Why do we require soundness on all of ?2., but. complrt,eness only on A? Notice that if we st,rcngt~llcn t,he definition to require soundness and conrplct,c~ncss on all of 72, then WC hnvc csscnlially ret.urtttd to 1.11~ tlcfmit.ion of I3I'I' knowlcdgc. On the otb~ hand, suppnse we weaken the definition to require soundnrss only on A. If membership in the set A is caaily t.est.able. t,hen such a not,ion of knowledge may be of interest. LVe will, however, be forced to consider arbitrary sets A in this work, and in this context it becomes rather uninteresting.
For suppose that processor q has access to an algorithm M that is guaranteed to be sound and complete only on A. Moreover, suppose that when q runs M repeatedly on its state Ye (nt) at some point (T, m), it finds that M almost always accepts. In this case, q knows that if it is at a point in A, then 'p holds. But since it may be quite dificult for q to determine whether it is at a point in A, this may not be very useful information. With our definition, q would know that K,cp (and hence 'p) holds at this point, regardless of whether the point is in A (since, by our definition, if 'K,cp holds, then A4 reject,s with high probability).
Of course, if A4 almost always rcjccts on input am, then q can say nothing without, knowing whether (I', tn.) is in A. We could instead have required conlpleteness on all of R and soundness on A. In cryptographic applications, however, it tends to be more important to be able to learn that cp is true than to learn that it is false. This choice is a matter of taste.
Let us return, now, to the context of interactive proof systems (P,V) for L. Let us say that a point of the system P x V is a final point if at that point the verifier has either accepted, rejected, or otherwise halted. Consider the set A of final points of P x V, and consider the test M that accepts at a point if the verifier has accepted at that point and rejects otherwise. Int)uitively, we would like to say that if x E L, then the good verifier BPP-knows x E L with respect to A at the end of a proof of z E L with the good prover. IJnfortunately, the test M is not a sound test for x E L since on rare occasions the verifier may incorrectly accept when 3: $ L. In the context of probabilistic computations, however, a test that fails on a negligible portion of the cases is practically as good as one that never fails. Since the soundness and completeness conditions required by the definition of knowledge with respect to a set A do not allow for such freedom, we are led to the following notion of practical knowledge where these conditions are somewhat relaxed. Practical knowledge plays an important role in our analysis of interactive proofs and zero knowledge.
Recall that M is a sound test for 'p in R if it is a sound test for 'p at all points in the system R. We would now like to consider such tests M that are sound tests for 'p at all points of most runs of 72. Formally, we say that, M is a praclicrrliy sound test for 'p if for all k there exist.s c such that
Similarly, if A is a set of points in 72, we say that M is a practically complete test for K,cp on A if for all k there exists c such that
Notice that we have ensured that the probabilities used in defining practical soundness and practical completeness are taken at the beginning of the run through the use of the antecedent init. This means that we are effectively considering tests that behave correctly on all but a small fraction of the runs. We ro111d have instead considered tests with the stronger property that they behave correctly at all but a small fraction of the points considered possible at any point (by deleting the antecedent inil). This latter notion can lead to dramatically d.ifferent results, but does not seem appropriate for most compmer science applica tions (in particular, it is not appropriate for capturing interactive proofs).
We now define "q practically BPP-knows 'p with respect to A" at a point (r,m), which we denote by (r,m) (= k:PPyA (p, in precisely the same way as we defined "q BPP-knows cp with respect to A," except that the soundness and completeness conditions are replaced by practical soundness and practical completeness. This notion of knowledge may at first seem rather strange. Most previously defined notions of knowledge based on, say, polynomial-time tests have said that a processor knows 'p at a point if its test for 'p says that, it knows 'p. Here, however, since the tests allowed by tl~c definition of practical knowlcdgc may bc in error on a small fraction of the rutis, it is possible for a processor to have practical knowledge of cp with respect to A at a point in A even though its test for knowledge of 'p may not indicate that it knows cp. When a processor practically knows cp with respect to A, it knows 'p and has a test that quite accurately approximates this knowledge on the set A. Now, returning to the problem of capturing the intuition that at the end of a proof of x E L with the good prover the good verifier learns z E L, l.et us reconsider the set A and test M defined above: let A be the set of final points of P x V, and let 44 be the test that accepts at a point if the verifier has accepted at that point and rejects otherwise. Notice that while the test M for 'p is not sound everywhere and not complete on A, it is praclical/y sound cverywhcrc and practically complete on A. As a consequence: we have the following.
We d cnote by 'y running P' the fact holding at a point ilf at that point the prover is running the protocol P. Proposition 3: If (P, V) is an interactive proof system for L, then
where A is the set of final :points of P x V satisfying 'p running P'.
In fact, we can essentially prove the converse of this proposition as well, which shows that we can characterize the notion of an interactive proof system using practical knowledge.
where A is the set of final points of P x V' satisfying 'p running P', then we can effectively modify V' to obtain V such that (P, V) is an interactive proof system for L.
The protocol V is simply the protoccl V" at the end of which the verihfr uses its test for pr.actical knowledge of 2 E L to decide whether to accept or reject. These results tell us that an interactive proof system for L is precisely one that guarantees that if the verifier is running against a good prover, then it will practically know that 2: E L at the end of the proof, and it will practically never be fooled (by nrry prover).
Zero Knowledge Proof Systems
Informally, an interactive proof syst,em (P, V) is zero knowledge if, whenever t E L, the verifier is able to generate on its own the conversations it could have had with the prover during an interactive proof of 2: E L. Consequently, the verifier learns nothing as the result of a conversation with the prover (other than the fact that x E L) that it could not have learned on its own by generating the conversation itself.
To make this precise, we first recall the no- It is important to notice that the probability is being taken over both the coin flips of M and the distributions of Uz,V and Vz,g.
Other notions of indistinguishability are defined in [GMR85] (i.e., perfect indislingvishabilily, slatistical itldis2ingulshability, and computalional indislinguishability).
Since polynomial indistinguishability is implied by each of these notions, our results, which are proven for polynomial indistinguishability, hold for these other notions as well.
Finally, an interactive proof system (P, V) for L is said to be X~YJ homlcdgc (cf. [GMR85, GMW8G] 
Mv.(t,~)
runs in expected tiine polynomial in IsI, and the families ((P(s), V*(t)) (x) : (x,s,t) E Dom) and (Mv+(t,~) : ( I, 6, t) E Dam} are polynomially indistinguishable, where (z,s,t) E Dom iff x E L, s is a possible input for P, and i is a possible input for I/*.
Knowledge and Zero Knowledge
In this section we formalize the intuition that if the verifier can learu a fact 'p at the end of a zero knowledge proof of E E L, theu the verifier can deduce cp frown 1: E L 011 its own at, the bcginrling of the proof. First, we need a short definitiou. We say that 'p is a fact aloul ahe initial state (in a syst.em 7Z) if (r, nz) b 'p iff (Y', ~1') k 'p for all points (r,ttl) and (r', m') of 72 with r(0) = r*'(O). Thus (o is a fact about the initial state if its truth at a given point in a run depends only on the initial state in that run.
The following theorem captures our intuition that the prover does not leak any information to the verifier during a zero knowledge proof of x E L other than the fact E E L. Roughly speaking, it says that if + E L and the verifier has a nontrivial chance of learning 10 at the end of a proof of z E L, then the verifier can already deduce 'p from z E L on its own without interacting with the prover. Consequently, provided .r E L, t,he only information that a prover leaks to the verifier in a zero knowledge proof of z E L are facts t.hat follow from T E L. The proviso that z E L is crucial hcrc*. Thrrc is tml,hing in t.lrc tlcfnition of a zero knowlcdgc proof lo stop tjlir provc>r fr0nI Icaking all sor1.s of inforn&on when E $ I,.
Tlworcm 5: Let (I', C') be a zero kuowledgr: proof system for L, let V' be an arbitrary verifier, and let 'p be a fact about the initial state. For every set A of final points in P x V' and every k there exist constants c and N such that where B is the set of initial points in P x V" satisfying z E L, 1~1 2 N, and Pr(OK~PP~A~) 2 IX/-~.
Proof: Fix a set A and a constant k. The definition of knowing 'p with respect to A ensures the existence of a test M for cp that is sound everywhere and complet,e on A. 'i%~ deiinitioti of a zero knowledge proof system (P, V) ensures the existence of a Turing machine Mv.(t, 2) that approximates (I-'(s), V*(t))(x). Informally, the proof proceeds as follows. Suppose that from an initial point (r,O) the probability of reaching a final point at which the test M indicates that cp holds is at least 1~1~~. Suppose that from this initial point we run Mv.(t, x) to generate a run of (P(s), V*(t)) (x) and apply the test M to its final state. If we repeat this procedure roughly 1~1" times, then with high probability we will generate a run at whose final state the test M will succeed, and hence with high probability we will learn that if t E L (and hence the simulating Turing machine Mv. (i, Z) is accurate), then p must hold. The details of the proof are left to the full paper. cl WC note that the same result holds when we replace practical knowledge by knowledge with respect to a set of points, but as we have seen in Section 4 the notion of practical knowledge seems to be of greater relevance to interactive protocols.
Stepping back and looking at the statement of Theorem 5, we see that the result is slightly unsatisfactory. Notice that in the system P x V" the verifier protocol V* is fixed, and hence known to the prover. The intuition behind zero knowledge proofs, however, is that even though the prover does not know the identity of the verifier, the prover knows that the verifier learns nothing at the end of the proof other than facts that follow from x E L. That, is, our intuition suggests that the statement of Theorem 5 should hold in the system P x VPP. We cannot prove such a result due to the order of quantification in the definition of zero knowledge guaranteeing only that for every verifier V* there is a Turing machine Mv*(l,~) approximating the dist.rihut,iorr of (P(s), V*(t))(x).
The prohlcrn is that because the Turing m&line Mv. cannot, in get)-eral bc choscu in some uniform way, and because the: tests for knowledge we allow must be uniform irr V*, we do not havc a lest for computing facts at the bcginning of all runs in P x PP. One solution to our problem is provided by the notion of black-box zero knowledge. An interactive proof system (P, V) for L is said to be strongly black-box zero knowledge [cf.
[Ore87]) if there is a probabilistic Turing machine M such that 1. M(V* , t, X) runs in expected time polynomial in 1x1, and 2. {(P(s), V*(t))(x) : (x, V*,s,t) E Dom} and {M (V*,t,x) : (x, V', s, t) E Dom} are polynomially indistinguishable, where (2, V', s, t) E Dom iff 2 E L, V" is a possible verifier protocol, s is a possible input for P, and f is a possible input for V'.
If (P, V) is a strongly blac.k-box zero knowledge proof system for L, then we can prove the analogue of Theorem 5 in the system P x V" instead of P x V*.
'Unfortunately, as the name suggests, the notion of strongly black-box zero knowledge is too strong. The problem is that in practice M(V", t,z) runs V' as a subroutine on input x. Even if M runs V* only once, the running time of iM is at least as great as the running time of V'. Consequently, even if we restrict our attention to polynomial-time V' as input to M, since the polynomial bounding the running time of I/* is different for every V*, the running time of M will not be bounded by a single polynomial. Oren avoids this problem in his definition of black-box zero knowledge by charging only one time step for a call to I/*. Thus, he is essentially viewing M as an oracle machine (rather than a purely polynomial-time Turing machine). We could modify our definitions to allow for knowledge with respect to oracle m,achines, but a more natural solution is to modify the measure we use of a test's complexity. In particular, suppose we consider tests for facts that run at a point (~,rn) in time polynomial in 1x1, the running time of V', and the description of V', where T is a run with input x in which the verifier is running the protocol V';. Then, defining a notion of practical knowledge with respect to such tests, the analogue of Theorem 5 follows with precisely the same proof. We note that all zero knowledge protocols we are aware of satisfy Oren's notion of black-box zero knowledge.
5.2
Generation and, Zero Knowledge
In the previous subsection we formalized the notion that the verifier in a zero knowledge proof learns essentially no fact other than what the prover explicitly set out to prove. This is not, however, the strongest notion of security one could hope for. It would also be desirable to show that, as a result of interacting with the prover, the verifier cannot do anything that it could not do before the interaction. We abstract the idea of the verifier bein,g able to do something its knowing how to generate a y such that R(x,y). For example, if R(z, y) holds prcecisely when y is a Hamiltonian circuit in a graph + on the input tape, then being able to generate a y such that R(x, $1) means being able to find a Hamilt~onian circuit in t,l~e graph %. Notice that, as in tflc! ciu;c of lIitllliltolliilll circuits, most natural relations R are testable in BPP. That is, there is a probabilistic algorithm running in time polynomial in 1x1, accepting (x, y) with probability at least 2/3 if R(z, y), and rejecting (x, y) with probability 2/3 if -R(x, y). We restrict our attention to such BPP testable relations here to simplify our exposition.
Just as we have said that the verifier knows a fact 'p if it has an algorithm to test for 'p, we would like to say that the verifier knows how to generate a y satisfying R(x, y) if it has an algorithm to generate such y. In previous sections we considered tests for facts 'p that were sound everywhere and correct on a set A of points. Here, alLlough there are no Iconditions analogous to soundness and completeness, we consider algorithms that do a "good job" of generating y's such that R(x, y) on a set A of points, but may not, perform so well off A. We say that the verifier L~~otrn hozu fo BPP-generate a y satisfying R(x, y) with respect to a se! .4 of points in a system R if there is a probabilistic algorithm, that, at all points (1',173) of -4, takrs as input the verifier's local stat,e and outputs with probability at least 2/3 a string y satisfying R(x, y). Formally, we write (r,m) /= GrPP8Ay.R(~, y) iff 1.
2.
(r,m) E A, and there is a probabilistic Turing machine M that at, points (r', m') E R takes the verifier's local state as input, runs in time polynomial in 1x1, and, if (T', m') E A, outputs with probability at least 2/3 a string y satisfying R(z, y11.
We have the following analogue to Theorem 5: TheoreIn 6: Let (P, V) be a zero knowledge proof system for L, let V' be an arbitrary verifier, and let R(z, y) be a relation testable in BPP. For every set A of final points in P x V' and every k, t.here exist c and N such that
where B is the set of initial points in P x V' satisfying z E L, 121 > N, and Pr(OG~PP~Ay.R(x, y)) 1 1x1-k.
Intuitively, this theorem says that if the verifier has a nonnegligible chance of being able to generate a y satisfying R(x, y) by talking to the prover, then the verifier can generate such a y on its own. We note that this theorem has a number of natural extensions. One simple extension is from generating a y satisfying relations R(x, y) to generating a y satisfying facts p(y) about the verifier's entire initial state. Another simple extension is, along the linns of practicnd knowledge, a notion of knowing flow to generate, dcmtctf by G;;"PIAy.R(z, y), where the algorithm may on a small fraction of the set A fail to generate y such that R(x, y). A final extension, using black-box zero knowledge, allows us to prove au a~mlogous result iu the system I' x VP. The details are left to the full paper.
The ability to test the relation R in BPP is crucial to the proof of Theorem 6. Recall that in the proof of Theorem 5 the verifier tests for the fact* II, by rcpcatcdly generating runs and testing for cp at t,hc end of each run. Since this test for cp is sound, t,lle verifier can accept as soon as this test, for 'p acccpts. Here, however, since there is no notion anal@ ~OIIS (,o SOIIII~II~~SS, UK* vc,rificbr hirs 110 way of kiIowing wltirll of I,llc IllitTly y's it gcwral~cs sat.ish IZ(x, y) and should IX output unless the relation K(x, g) can t)c I,ested in 13PP. We discuss annlogues of Theorem 6 when R(z, y) is not testable in BPP in the full paper.
6 Resource-bounded provers
In an interactive proof system as defined in [GMR85] , the prover is assumed to be infinitely powerful. In practice, however, a prover is not infinitely powerful and may have no more computational power than the verifier. Fort,unately, a probabilistic, polynomial-time prover with some "secret. information" on ifs work tape is able t,o Cilrry out. many of blic iirl.crt3ling intera.ct,ive prot,ocols. IO I,hc case of tlic graph isonrorplrism protocol givcu in [GMW8G], for cxanlplc, this secret informat,ion is an isomorphisnl bebwrcn the graphs on t.tir input, tape. Since t.lir context of such weak (I~olynolnial-t.inle) provers is actually t.hc context of n~ost. pract.ical int,erest,, the type of security afforded by zero knowledge protocols in this context is an important question, and the subject of our final section.
In order to study zero knowledge proofs in this context, we define the notion of a weak interactive proof system! a direct. modification of the definition of an interactive proof system for L. We define a weak interactive protocol to be an interactive protocol (P,V) where both P and V run in probabilistic, polynomialtime. IVe define a toeaL interactive proofsystem (P, V) for (I lnngllngc L just as we defined an interactive proof system for L except that we require ( P, V) to bc a weak interactive protocol and we restrict the quant~iticat.iorl of P" in t.he soundness condition to be only ov('r probabilistic, polynonlial-t.illke machines, rather t,han over all machines. As the following lemma shows, howevt>r, weak interactive proofs of language tncmbership arc not very int,erestitig.
Lemnla 7: There is a weak interactive proof system for L iff L is in BPP.
Thus, an interesting weak interactive proof cannot be simply a proof of language membership; it must reveal something about the prover's local state, and hence, since the prover's knowledge is determined by its local state, it must reveal something about the prover's knowledge.
Consider the zero knowledge proofs of graph isomorphism and three-colorability given in [GMW86] . These proofs can be carried out by a weak prover with the appropriate information on its worktape. And in both cases, the verifier obtains information about the prover's knowledge as well as about language membership.
In the case of gr;ipl1 isonlor~~l~isni, tli~ vcrifictr Icnrns tlti1.1, wil.tl high prot~;&ility, IJlc prover can gcncratc: an isolatorphistn between the graphs in question. Similarly, in the case of three-colorability, the verifier learns that with high probability the prover can generate a three coloring of the graph in question. It is well-known (see [HM84, MDH86] ) that information about the prover's knowledge can dramatically affect the verifier's knowledge about the world. For example, in the case of three-colorability, information about the prover's knowledge may indicate to the verifier that the prover has with high probability communicated with the entity that generated the three-colorable graph.
In order to study proofs of the prover's knowledge, we extend the definition of a weak interactive proof of language membership to that of a weak interactive proof about the prover's initial state, where a fat t R( I'*, c, s) is about the prover's initial state if its truth depends only on the prover's protocol P', its initial work tape s, and the common input 2. The definition of a weak interactive proof of R(P*, t, s) is obtained simply by replacing all occurrences of x E L by R(P*, t, s) in the definition of a weak interactive proof of language membership. Formally, we define a weak interactive proof system for a fact R about the prover's initial state to be a weak interactive protocol (P, V) such that
Completeness:
For every k and sufficiently large I, and for every s and t, if R(P,z,s) then PI-[(P(s), V(t))(z) accepts] 2 1 -12(-k Soundness: For every k and sufficiently large I, for every probabilistic, polynomial-time P', and for every s and 2, if -JZ( P", I, s) then Pr [(P*(s), V(t))(r) accepts] 5 IX!-" .
The reader may wonder why we consider weak interactive proofs of facts about the prover's initial state that depend on the prover's protocol as well as its worktape. Suppose R(t, s) is a fact about the prover's worktape and the common input; that is, the truth of R(x, s) depends only on the prover's worktape s and the common input z (and not on the prover's protocol).
Let us define &m(R) to be the set (x : R(z, s) for some s}.
Lemma 8: A weak interactive protocol (P, V) is a weak interactive proof system for a fact R about the prover's worktape and the common input ifl 1. for all sufficiently large x and for all s, we have R(x, s) iff x E dam(R); and
dam(R) is in BPP.
This lemma says that if there is a weak interactive proof of a fact R about the prover's worktape and the com1non input, then R is essentially uninteresting. In part,icular, with the exception of a few small values of x, R(+, s) holds for so1ne s iff El(c, s') for all s'. Consequently, R is esselltially determined by do?n( IZ). Since dam(R) is in BPP, the prover can determine whether R holds (for sufflcienltly large z) without even interacting with the prover. Consequently, a fact R about the prover's initial sta,te having only nontrivial weak interactive proofs must necessarily be a fact depending on the prover's protocol, and hence on the prover's entire initial state. Since the prover's knowledge is determined by its local state, such ,3 weak interactive proof may be viewed as a proof of the prover's knowledge. In fact, 'we note that even in the context of infinitely powerfud provers an interactive proof oft E L is not just a proof of z E L but a proof the prover knows z E L. Tlhe fact that all interesting interactive proofs must be proofs of the prover's knowledge is obscured in the context, of infinitely powerful provers since I E L holds iff the prover knows x E L,. In the context of weak prover, however, these facts are not equivaleut.
We have defirled a 11atural notio11 of i11toractive proof in the cont,ext of wca,k provers, and VW have: show11 that the o111y 11ontrivial interactive proofs i11 this context are proofs aboul; the prover's knowledge. While our definition is a direct modification of the definition in the case of strotng provers, it is not initially clear that our definition is the most appropriate in the context of weak provers, and hence that, our results are more than simply aztifacts of our definition. As evidence supporting our definition, we now show that, under certain natural conditions, bot:h interactive proof syste1ns FFS87, TW87) involving weak provers that have appeared in the literature are instances of weak interactive proofs. Not surprisingly, in light, of our previous results, these proof systems concern proofs of the prover's knowledge.
WC focus here on ['I'W87] . and leave the di:icussion of [F1?387] Lo the full paper. III [I'W87] we fir~tl the following definition (modified slightly for the sake of consistency with the rest ol' this a,bstract). Give11 a binary relation 12, a weak interactive protocol (P, V) is said to be an interactive proof thaf the prover can generate some y satisfying R(z, y) if the following conditions are satisfied:
For every k and sufficiently large x, and ,or every s and t, if R(z,s), then Pr [(P(s), V(t))(x) accepts] 2 1 -JxlVf .
l Soundness: For every probabilislic, polynomialtime P' t.here is a probabilistic Turing machine h4~~ running in time polynon~iai in 1x1 sucli t.11a.f for all /z and sufficiently large .r, and for all s and 1, PF[V accepts at (r,m) 3 R(r, AIf,. (7*p,(n1)))] > 1 -1.z1-1-where the probability is taken over the runs of (P*(s), V(t))(x) and the coin flips of niip. .5
While we would like to show that every int,eractive proof that the prover can generate some y satisfying R(;c, y) is a weak interactive proof, this is not quite true. To see this, notice that the definition of a weak interactive proof requires that (P(s), V(t))(z) accept with probability very close to 0 or 1, while an interactive proof of [TW87] allows (P(s), V(t))(z) to accept with any probability as long as P is able to generate a y satisfying R(t, y). We can prove, however, that the following is a necessary and suf5cicnt. condit.ion for a11 i11t.cr;rct.ivr proof of [TW87] t,o be a weak interactive proof: 0 Grrrcl71.cs.s: For every k and suificit~ntly large 6, il.iicl for c'vcry s and t, if R(r, s) tloc3 noi. lroltl, the11 Pp [(P(s), V(t))(x) accepts] 5 IzI-".
In other words, the good prover succeeds in convincing the good verifier to accept only when R(z,s) holds. We note that the correctness condition can be satisfied ifl R(z, y) is testable in BPP. Since this seems to be the most relevant context in practice, this seems to be a natural restriction. We have seen that the correctness condition is necessary for an interactive proof SWe note that the soundness condition in [TWS?'] actually quantifies over all Turing machines P' and 110t just over polynomial-time P'. Since, however, Lhc motivatior~ for considering weak prowrs is that in practice at1 a(5crkt.s are restricted to polynolnial-l.ilnf:, our restriction does not swn~ unnatural. Furthennow, we nok that the macl~irre A!,>. is ~aIlowed in ['r'W87] lo run ill ox pc~locl I,"lytlotlli:~l-tinI(~.
In tlrc. cY-mt.c!xt cd HI'I'. testable relat,iorls ti, however, the context WF find of most interest, we can assume without loss of gewralily that the machine Mp* runs in polynomial-time.
of [TW87] to be a weak interactive proof. To see that this condition is sufficient, let R'(P*, x, s) be the fact "(p running P A R(z, s)) V (p running P' # PA the soundness condition holds for P*)."
(Note that R' depends on the prover's protocol as well as the work tape, and is a fact about the prover's initial state.) We now have the following. Propositiorr 0: (p, V) is an int.eracbive proof satisfying t.he correctness condition that the prover can generate a y such t,hat, R(x, y) ifl (I', V) is a weak interactive proof system for ZZ'.
We can show, in addition, that the proof systems of [FFS87] satisfying the correctness condition above are also instances of a weak interactive proof system.
Having shown that, in light of Proposition 9, our definition of a weak interactive proof system seems to be an appropriate definition, let us turn to the study of the security afforded by such protocols. Our definition of a weak interactive proof is a direct modification of the definition of an interactive proof of language membership.
We can also directly modify the definition of a zero knowledge proof of language membership t,o obtain a definition of a zero knowledge weak irlteract,ive proof. Not surprisingly, arrnlogues of all our previous resu1t.s for ilIt.criKt.ivc~ proofs hold in the case of weak interactive proofs, with essentially the same proofs. Rather than restnt,ing all the results here, we focus on one of them, the analogue of Proposition 1. If R is a fact about the prover's initial state, then we say (r, m) b R if R(P', x, s), where P' is the protocol t.hat p is running in r, 2: is the common input in the initial state r(O), and s is the contents of p's work tape in r(O).
Proposition 10: A weak interactive protocol (P, V) is a weak interactive proof system for a fact R about the prover's initial state iff the following conditions are satisfied: Thus, we have replaced t.hc occurrences of .c E L in Proposition 1 by 12, and used PPP rather than P in the soundness condition since we are restricting to weak provers. As we mentioned in our discussion in Section 3, while the order of quantification in the statement of soundness is irrelevant in the case of strong provers, it does play a role in the case of weak provers. In particular, if we had stated our soundness condition so that the choice of "sufficiently large Z" might depend ou the protocol P', all we would be able to prove is that for every k and every protocol P', there exists c such that Y* x V b init > Pr [Oaccepl> R] 2 1 -c ]z]-~ .
We remark that the weak interactive protocols resulting from the interactive proofs and zero knowledge proofs we are aware of satisfy the stronger notion of soundness we have used in our definition.
In addition to proving the analogues of results holding in the context of strong provers, we can reason about the interactive proofs of [FFS87, TW87] directly in terms of the notions of knowledge and generation we have defined in previous sections. For example, we can characterize proofs that the prover can generate some y satisfying R(z, y) just as we characterized interactive proofs, in the case that R(x, y) is testable in BPP.
Proposition 11: Given a relation R(x, y) testable in BPP, a weak interactive protocol (P, V) is a weak interactive proof that the prover can generate some y satisfying /<(~,y) iff the following conditions are satisfied : where A is the set of points of P' x V at which the verifier has accepted.
Notice that in the soundness condition, we have accept 3 Gp BPP~Ay.R(z,y) rather than Oaccepl > GBPP,Ay.IZ(~, y). The first clar~sc says tha.t. the prover P can generate some y such that R(x,y) at the point when tlie verifier accepts, as required by [TW87] , and not at, the initial point as would be the case with the: stxwrrd clause. This is one of the differences hetwecti the definitions of [TW87] and [FFS87] . A second difference between the two definitions is that the soundness condition of [FFS87] is such that we can state the soundness condition above in terms of the system PPP x V instead of P' x V. We return to these points in the full paper.
Conclusions References
The main contribution of this work lies in suggesting notions of knowledge appropriate for interactive proofs, characterizing interactive proofs in terms of these notions, and proving, again in terms of these notions, that the prover in a zero knowledge proof system does not leak any information other than ,the fact it set out to prove. Roughly speaking, we have shown that a zero knowledge proof system for 2 E L satisfies the following property, which we call knowledge security: the prover is guaranteed that, with high proba bility, if the verifier will practically know a fa.ct 'p at the end of the proof, it practically knows t E L, > cp at the start. We have also formalized the notion of knowing how to generate, and shown that zero knowledge proofs also satisfy an analogous property of geaeraiSon seczlrily. (The precise formulations of knowledge and generation security are provided by the statements of Theorems 5 and 6.) It is currently an open question whether either of these notions of security characterizes zero knowledge (that is, say, whether an interactive proof that satisfies the property of knowledge security is also a zero knowledge proof). We ca.n show, however, that any protocol that satisfies the knowledge security property is rel:ognilion zero knowledge, as defined in [DS88] . We discuss this issue in greater detail in the full paper.
We feel that these security results shed some light on the type of security zero knowledge proofs provide. Our theorems provide support for the definitions of interactive proofs and zero knowledge and our model provides a good semantic setting for such an analysis. Some of the definitions, chiefly that of practical knowledge, are quite subtle. Many straightforward definitions one may try fail by being inappropriate for the cryptographic setting and not providing a useful sense in which zero knowledge proof systems provide security. A;s Feige, Fiat, and Shamir write in [FFS87] , "the notil3n of "knowledge' is very fuzzy, and a-priori it is not c.lear what proofs of knowledge actually prove." We hope to have established a framework within which such questions can now be answered.
